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Abstract
If voters of di¤erent countries adhere to di¤erent and deeply rooted cul-
tural norms, the country leaders may nd it impossible to agree on e¢ cient
policies especially in hard times. The conformity constraint -political leaders
unwillingness or impossibility to depart from these norms - has resulted in lack
of timely intervention which has amplied an initially manageable debt crisis
for some European countries to the point of threatening the Euro as a single
currency. We show the conditions under which the introduction of a scal
union can be obtained with consensus and be benecial. Perhaps counter-
intuitively, cultural diversity makes a scal union even more desirable. Some
general lessons can also be drawn on the interaction of cultural evolution and
institutional choice.
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Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for
those crises(Jean Monnet).
1 Introduction
This paper looks at an understudied important source of political failure that stems
from a cultural clash. The cultural clash helps us understand the German (mis)-
management of the Greek sovereign debt crisis and also provides a novel foundation
for scal union desirability. The failure we focus on arises most clearly when two
culturally distant populations must interact to solve a common problem. Hence it is
inherently international, or, more generally, it has to do with the impact of domestic
re-election or approval constraints on the strategies that political leaders play among
themselves in the absence of a common agency. A political leader is constrained in
terms of strategies by the cultural norms and beliefs of his electorate - what we call
a "conformity constraint". Leaders of a country cannot pursue strategies that go
against these deeply rooted norms and beliefs even when doing so could be welfare-
improving for their citizens. For example, it would be very di¢ cult for Indias leaders
to pass a law that forces Indian food rms to produce beef formula when a famine
hits the country. Even if political representatives know this is the best policy from
a nutritional point of view, it would simply fail to pass or if passed it would fail
to succeed because it would not be followed by most of the people. Anticipating
this reaction, the leader would just avoid proposing it. The conformity constraint
would be binding. If this is the mechanism at work it would be hard to identify it
in a domestic and culturally homogeneous context. The dilemma that the informed
leader faces - impose the law and save millions of children or conform to peoples
beliefs and let children die- would not be observed as the latter strategy would always
be chosen and the alternative would never be on the table. Hence one cannot learn
about the importance (and the costs) of this political economy friction. This dilemma
can instead be best appreciated when political leaders of di¤erent countries interact.
In this case, the possibility that the optimal policy leads to a cultural clash, so that it
is welcome to one of the two electorates but culturally opposed by the other, implies
that, together with the dilemma of its adoption, it is on the table. We argue that such
a friction can help us better understand Germany conduct in the management of the
Greek (and more generally Europes) sovereign debt crisis. Germans and Germany
reaction to the discovery in October 2009 that the previous Greek government cooked
the books hiding half of the government scal decit was to "punish" the Greeks by
"denying timely help" when, according to various observers, early action would have
contained the crisis. A survey by Emnid, a polling agency, in February 2010 reveals
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that nearly 70% of the Germans opposed aid to Greece. One of the consequences
was a delay in the adoption of the rescue packages, an aggravation of the Greek
crisis, a rise of risk premia on the Greek debt which worsened Greece ability to
repay the debt, and a propagation of the crisis to the other PIIGS (Portugal, Italy,
Ireland, Greece and Spain). Ultimately the Greek crisis has threatened the very
survival of the Euro, an event that according to many observers would have had
extremely costly consequences not only for the Mediterranean countries in the Euro
area but for Germany as well. Why would Germany be willing to run the risk of
paying this cost? One answer is that the size of the cost is understated by German
policy makers who do not understand the general equilibrium implications of their
actions. Without denying that some misunderstanding of the general equilibrium
implications of their own actions by German political leaders may have played a role
in such a complex crisis 1 we propose an alternative explanation. We argue that
German political leaders understand well the dangers of their actions and foresee
the possible consequences of the "punishment" strategy for their own country ( they
are informed representatives), but are bound by a conformity constraint: the need
to conform with the widely shared and deeply rooted cultural norms of their fellow
citizens that, as we document in detail in Section 3, establishes punishment of the
"cheaters", which in this case happen to be the Greeks.2
In a recent article, Ardagna and Caselli (2012) have pointed out the di¢ culties
of negotiations among heads of States at the European Council as a potential source
of ine¢ cient solutions for the Greek crisis, and they conclude that perhaps the best
way to avoid negotiation-related political economy frictions would have been to let
the IMF handle the Greek crisis. The type of political economy failures we identify
are di¤erent and so is the solution: the failures stem from heterogeneous cultures and
the clash that this heterogeneity in culture creates would therefore be best addressed
by the creation of a new type of agency - a scal union - free from conforming to the
culture of any single country in the union. At the positive analysis level, we do not
think the friction was (mainly) one of negotiation costs, because from the beginning
the problem has basically been "what does Germany think", which therefore concerns
more understanding Germany than understanding the negotiation process between
Germany and others. At the normative analysis level, the cultural reasons why the
Germans do not want to save the Greeks unless the Greekssovereignty is suspended
have to do with moral hazard (cheating expectations), and hence Germany would
1This begs the question why the other European leaders see the problem while the German
leaders do not
2Undoubtedly, political leaders may try to ease the conformity constraint by steering public
opinion, but this usually takes time, which unavoidably delays action.
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have opposed such saving even through the IMF. On the other hand, a scal union,
which means elimination of the game between sovereign States, nds Germany more
willing to help because not threatened by future moral hazard and nds Greek debt
"less" punished. In other words, while IMF would still make donors upset about
helping out countries who could be prone to moral hazard, going for a scal union
that requires management of scal policy by a European nance minister would avoid
the ine¢ cient punishments as well as the risk of moral hazard and hence the worries
and cultural clashes.
Though the creation of a scal union may be the best response to the cultural
clash that in our view is at the root of the European sovereign debt crisis, it raises
two questions. First, why was it not adopted in the rst place when the Euro-
area countries decided to merge into a monetary union? Second, why should it be
appealing today given that it was disregarded before? We show that our model
can rationalize the historical sequencing - that is the creation of a monetary union
without a scal union - and the appeal of a scal union at a later stage, following
the cultural clash.
For this we need rst a notion of culture. By culture, people mean di¤erent
things. For us a culture is represented directly by what strategies people play,
which will allow us to trace its evolution using replicator dynamics (as in Boyd
and Richerson, 1985 and 2005). This simple notion of culture refers to behavior
in interactive situations3 and captures a key aspect of cultural norms: they evolve
very slowly compared to the speed of change of formal institutions, particularly
those related to governance (Williamson, 2000). While culture evolves gradually
institutions can jump - a feature that makes the creation of a new institution a
viable response to a cultural clash. We will rst show that evolution can bring a
homogeneous culture population (i.e., a population where everybody has the same
perception of the frequency of the various actions and reactions) to multiple steady
states. Depending on the initial conditions, an economy can either converge to a
"cheat and forgive" equilibrium or to a "responsible actions and commitment to
punish otherwise" equilibrium. We will often refer to these two equilibria as the
Greek and German culture equilibrium, respectively.
The next step will be to study what happens when two populations playing dif-
ferent steady states and having di¤erent cultures merge into a monetary union. For
3Therefore, we do not deal with the source of individual cultural values. An alternative modelling
strategy would be to derive explicitly the adoption of cultural norms letting parents optimally choose
the values to teach to their kids as in Tabellini (2008b) and Bisin and Verdier (2000b, 2001) or
the beliefs to instill, as in Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008b), possibly accounting for learning
through socialization (Bisin and Verdier,2000a).
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us the term monetary union refers to a highly integrated form of union in terms
of market transactions and hence greater potential for cross-country matches as a
reection of lower transaction and mobility costs entailed by a common currency. A
scal union, instead, is there to represent a big step towards integrating governing
institutions and authorities with a rst order e¤ect on the relationship between in-
dividuals and the latter, such as the incentive to cheat and punish. Merging into a
monetary union carries benets in terms of enlargement of the total available oppor-
tunities due to economies of scale and scope (e.g. Baldwin, 2006) which translate in
larger (expected) payo¤s to interacting parties. The cost is the potential exposure
to a cultural clash which increases with the cultural distance between the merging
countries. On the other hand, a scal union, in addition to a monetary union, carries
benets in terms of better management in the event of a clash at the cost however
of loss in sovereignty, which we model as a cost unrelated to cultural distance.
We show that ex-ante, provided the expected benets from integration into a
monetary union are su¢ ciently large, countries may agree to join a monetary union
but not to endow the union with new institutions - that is to form also a scal union
- if the cost of loosing sovereignty is large enough. Ex-post, once the monetary union
is formed members of the union will observe the realized benets from participation
in the union. If the latter are lower than initially expected - that is a "crisis" real-
izes - the cultural heterogeneity among the member countries may result is highly
ine¢ cient outcomes. Because national governments retain power and authorities are
thus subject to the conformity constraint, the interactions between Greeks and Ger-
mans result into excessive "cheating" (by the Greeks) and excessive "punishment"
(by the Germans) with a generalized loss of welfare which is increasing in the de-
gree of cultural heterogeneity and which cannot vanish rapidly given the inertia of
cultural norms. In such circumstances countries may reconsider participation in the
union facing either the choice of breaking up and reverting to a national currency
equilibrium or otherwise considering the creation of a scal authority that can be
endowed with any punish-forgive strategy the players agree to, hence giving a better
chance of converging to a superior steady state and with lower transition costs. We
show that there are parameter values for which ex-post continuation of the mone-
tary union and evolution into a scal union is the preferred option. Interestingly, the
space of parameters for which a scal union dominates a union without creation of
a new enforcement authority increases with cultural di¤erence.
Hence, the larger the cultural clash that induces larger di¤erences in beliefs about
punishing or enforcing probabilities, the more the trade-o¤ should push towards
advocating delegation of scal policy or more generally delegation to a third agent.
Hence, the fact that Europe has countries with more heterogeneous cultures than it
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was the case in the US at the time of the Constitution should push towards an a
fortiori argument in favor of centralization of scal policy, rather than the other way
round, which is often the common sense.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss how our
papers is linked to the literature. In Section 3 we show evidence of the Greek-
German cultural di¤erence which opens up to the possibility of political clash when
the two cultures are exposed to each other. In Section 4 we present our model of the
evolution of culture and institutions and obtain our main results. The model can: a)
rationalize two steady states where two di¤erent cultures prevail (the "German" and
the "Greek") and we can think of them as capturing the pre-monetary union situation
(Sections 4.3-4.4); b) rationalize the choice of the two countries to merge initially into
a monetary union without a scal union to reap the economic benets of a common
currency while avoiding the political costs of surrendering scal autonomy. Thus the
model can, in a very stylized way, account for the historical pattern of integration
observed in Europe and single out the role played by cultural heterogeneity (Section
4.5); c) show that a scal union that was initially ruled out may become again
appealing when the monetary union is hit by an adverse shock (which we can think
as mapping the Great Recession and the associated European sovereign crisis) and
the cultural clash is given a chance to manifest its adverse e¤ects; here we show that
the appeal of the scal union increases with cultural distance (Section 4.6). Finally,
in Section 5 we provide some evidence that cultural norms did in fact play a role in
the way Germany has managed the Greek crisis and discuss alternative explanations
. Section 6 concludes.
2 Relation to the literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it is related to a bur-
geoning set of studies on the role of culture in explaining di¤erences in economic
prosperity across countries and communities (see among others Greif, 1994; Landes,
1999; Mokyr, 2012; Tabellini, 2008a; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004, 2008a);
Roland, 2010; and Nunn, 2012). These papers rely on the persistence of culture to
explain enduring e¤ects of old historical episodes on current di¤erences in economic
success. While we retain cultural persistence, we focus on the role that slow-to-
change cultural norms and beliefs can play in dealing with shocks that are likely to
occur at the business cycle frequency. Hence it bears a link with macroeconomics
and the few papers that have attempted to insert culture into macroeconomic models
(e.g. Akerlof, 2007) or test empirically whether culture can be a cause of macroeco-
nomic imbalances (Buetzer et al, 2012). Furthermore, while most of these papers
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view cultural norms as a¤ecting economic prosperity because they support cooper-
ation and thus facilitate exchange among people (e.g. Tabellini, 2008a; GSZ, 2004,
2012; Landes, 1999), or because they enhance individual motivation (Gorodnichenko
and Roland, 2011a), or because they dictate directly individual behavior (Akerlof,
2007), in our case cultural norms a¤ect macroeconomic outcomes because they act
as a conformity constraint on policy makers, limiting their freedom to adopt the
best policy in the given circumstances. To our knowledge we are the rst to notice
the importance of this channel of inuence and view cultural norms as a source of
friction in political economy. Second, our work relates to various papers that rely
on cultural distance to explain patterns of international trade (e.g. Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales, 2009; Fisman, Hamao and Wang, 2012). We highlight the fact that
the conformity constraint is more likely to be identied when two (or more) cultures
are merged - as when a pool of countries decide to enter an economic or monetary
union - and thus a cultural clash can occur and become visible.
Third, the paper relates to a number of contributions that study the interplay
between cultural norms (informal institutions) and legal norms (formal institutions)
and their mutual inuences. Several papers stress the fact that culture and legal
institutions tend to coevolve (Tabellini, 2008b; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011b;
Bisin and Verdier, 2012). In our model too in the long run institutions and culture
may move together, but the process may be far from smooth. In our model institu-
tions can change discretely - or at least at a much faster speed than culture. Hence,
they may adjust in response to a potentially harmful cultural clash when a cultur-
ally heterogenous community is hit by a shock. Culture may subsequently and slowly
adapt, possibly a¤ected by the new institutional set up. Finally, our contribution is
related to the literature on scal union desirability. Fiscal union can be benecial for
a variety of reasons; because it may produce greater equality (Morelli, Yang and Ye,
2012); because it provides stability and insurance (e.g. Luque, Morelli and Tavares,
2012; Fahri and Werning, 2012); or because it may have a discipline e¤ect - in the
sense that when the policy is conducted at the union level the scope for local moral
hazard by the participant countries is reduced. We stress the importance of scal
union as a way of tempering and managing frictions in a culturally dis-homogeneous
community that is already bound by a single currency or a free trade agreement. Said
di¤erently, faster to change institutions can be the solution to the costs imposed by
slow to adjust cultural norms in response to a change in the environment.
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3 The Greek-German Cultural Clash
We start by documenting a signicant cultural distance between Germany and Greece.4
Table 1 panel A shows summary statistics on several measures of cultural traits in
a sample of Germans and a sample of Greeks taken from the World Values Survey.
We report about three sets of values and beliefs: measures of civic values, measures
of cultural norms constructed by Tabellini (2008a) and a measure of people trust
in other fellow citizens. The last two columns report the di¤erence in these mea-
sures between Germany and Greece and the value of the t-test for the di¤erences.
The table documents a remarkable systematic di¤erence between the values that
are shared by the Germans and those shared by the Greeks: with the exception of
whether accepting a bribe is justiable (which is equally not justiable in Germany
as in Greece) all other values are highly statistically di¤erent in the two countries.
The Germans tend to have higher civic values and stronger cultural traits (respect,
obedience an control) that ought to encourage welfare enhancing social interactions
(Tabellini, 2008a). Furthermore, the Germans tend to trust other Germans more
than the Greeks trust other Greeks by a large margin (14 percentage points more).
However, these data do not say much on whether and how the two populations
di¤er in their attitudes when it comes to the decision to punish others, a feature
which seems to have played a critical role in a¤ecting Germany position on how to
manage the Greek crisis. Even though the fact that the Germans seem to consider to
a greater extent than the Greeks that "Cheating on taxes is never justiable", from
this it does not follow that if they are given the possibility to punish a cheater they
do it more often than the Greeks. Panel B sheds some light on this. It shows answers
provided by the Greeks and the Germans to three questions asked in the European
Social Survey that reveal their willingness to punish (or help the punishment of)
wrongdoers. The rst is: "How likely are you to call the police if you see a man
get his wallet stolen ?", the second, "How willing are you to identify the person who
had done it?", the third "How willing are you to give evidence in court against the
accused?". Answers are provided on a scale from 1 to 4, ranging from "not at all
willing" (coded 1) to "very willing" (coded 4).
On each of the three accounts the Germans are signicantly more willing to punish
wrongdoers than the Greeks. The di¤erence appears neatly in Figure 1 which shows
the distribution of the answers for the samples in the two countries. For example,
79% of the Germans compared to 59% of the Greeks are "very willing" to call the
4Similar clashes could probably be documented for other bilateral comparisons between other
northern and southern countries in the Euro zone (see Buetzer et al (2012) for potential evidence),
but the Greece Germany clash is the most evident, as documented in the text.
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police and 70% of the Germans are "very willing" to identify the person compared
to only 45% of the Greeks.
Yet, rather then reecting di¤erent cultures the di¤erence in willingness to report
and collaborate with the police may reect other features - e.g. a more e¢ cient
German police which increases Germans motivation to collaborate as they can see
the benet of their e¤ort. A very interesting experiment conducted by Herrmann
et al. (2008) provides evidence that is free from this objection and is thus able to
isolate the cultural di¤erence. They run a public good game experiment using 16
comparable participant samples from countries around the world, including Greece
and Germany. The public good game aims at mimicking situations that require
some degree of cooperation to achieve a socially benecial outcome - as with the
nancing of a public good. They endowed participants with 20 tokens and let them
play in groups of four. Each participant had to decide how many tokens to keep
for themselves and how many to contribute to a group project. Each member of
the group earned 0.4 tokens for each token invested in the project, regardless of
whether he or she contributed any. Because the cost of contributing one token to the
project was exactly one token whereas the return on that token was only 0.4 tokens,
keeping all own tokens was always in any participants material individual interest,
irrespective of how much the other three group members contributed. Besides the
contribution decision, in one of the treatments of the games each participant was
given also the possibility to punish each of the other group members after they were
informed about the otherscontributions to the public investment. The punishment
was in the form of a monetary loss imposed on the punished by the punisher, who
retained his anonymity.
When no punishment is available the Germans tend to contribute more to the
public good than the Greeks, thus showing that the latter tend to free ride more
frequently. The Germans produce more public good than the Greeks. When players
are given the possibility to punish the other players upon seeing their contributions,
what they nd is striking. The Germans overwhelmingly use part of their endowment
to punish those who contributed less. The Greeks, on the contrary, not only do not
punish those who free ride but tend instead to punish those who contribute more
than them! That is, they exhibit what Herrmann et al. (2008) label antisocial
punishment. Put di¤erently, Germany seems to be characterized by a culture of
cooperation and social punishment where people are endowed with behavioral rules
that ask them to contribute to the public good and to punish those who do not,
thus providing a mechanism to enforce cooperative behavior. In Greece it seems to
prevail a week culture of cooperation that justies free riding behavior and where
cooperators, not free riders, are given a hard time. It may not sound surprising
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that these two cultures may clash when forced to interact with each other as the
management of a nancial crisis under a common currency requires.
We now turn to set up a formal model of how these two culture may arise in
the rst place and what happens when individuals with a culture of "Cheating and
Forgiving" interact with people that play according to a culture of "Responsibility
and Punishment". We will show that the extrapolation of domestic rules to the
international game may produce suboptimal outcomes.
4 Model of Evolution of Cultures and Institutional
Choice
4.1 Big Picture and Setup
Given the strong evidence that culture evolves endogenously but slowly,5 and di¤erent
cultures can coexist,6 we adopt a simple evolutionary model where indeed multiple
individual strategies evolve slowly and could coexist.7
We assume that strategies adjust following replicator dynamics, as in Boyd and
Richerson (1985, 2005). In our setup, as in many others with di¤erent frictions (see
e.g. Tabellini 2008b), the existence of di¤erent cultures will be described as existence
of multiple steady states to such an evolutionary process. However, while there are
many models of multiplicity of cultures as multiple equilibria or multiple steady
states, the rst innovation here is that we ask what happens when two di¤erent
cultures have to "merge", for example due to an economic or monetary union of
countries previously operating under a di¤erent steady state culture. Moreover, in
5A growing literature provides models of how culture is transmitted and why it persists. In
an earlier contribution, Bisin and Verdier (2000a) attribute cultural transmission to the parents
desire to have children with values similar to themselves. Tabellini (2008b) identies the source of
cultural persistence in the fact that parents use their own preferences in deciding which set of values
to instill in their children. Finally, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008b) claim that persistence
is the reection of a bias in the transmission mechanism: because parents are more likely to bear
the cost of childrens mistakesthan to enjoy the benets of their successes, they are conservatives
in the set of values they choose to transmit. Another branch of this literature is empirical and
focuses on the persistence of cultural attitudes over several centuries long periods of time (Nunn
and Wanchekon, 2011; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Grosjean (2011); Alesina et al., 2011)) or across
three or four generations (e.g. Tabellini, 2008a), Algan and Cahuc (2010).
6Cite evidence of coexistence of cultures.
7In a game theoretic setting, it is clear that the meaning of culture can either be reconducted
to strategies or to beliefs. We could obtain our results from both types of stylizations of culture,
but the modeling of culture as strategies is the easiest one for us to handle.
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contrast with the other models of culture multiplicity, we will also endow the leaders
of countries with di¤erent cultures with the ability to agree on a change of institutions
if the respective countries merge. Our broad view is that while the cultures of
populations evolve slowly, institutions can be subject to discontinuous jumps, even
though the leaders themselves have to conform to their respective cultures when
making such institutional choices. This, for instance, captures the construction of a
common currency among a set of culturally heterogeneous European countries and is
consistent with Williamson (2000) characterization of the speed of change of di¤erent
types of institution.8
In line with the broad view described above, we will rst describe an economy as
a set of bilateral interactions between pairs of agents that are programmed to play
specic strategies, like in any replicator dynamics model; then we will compute the
steady states of economies that start from any initial combination of programmed
strategies; then we will let the leaders of di¤erent countries (whose people have con-
verged to di¤erent steady states) decide whether they want to merge their economies
or not, and, in the case the answer is yes, whether they want to do so maintaining
their respective sovereignty or whether they want to create a set of alternative au-
thorities. We will show the conditions under which if new institutions are created the
merging of cultures can lead to more benecial coexistence and eventually conver-
gence with respect to the case in which people and countries with di¤erent cultures
insist to keep their own institutions. Finally, we will show that when technology, en-
dowments, or the size of economies of scale are uncertain and subject to shocks, such
an exogenous dynamics a¤ect both the slow cultural changes and the discrete jumps
in institutional choices in a way that can help us interpret the European dynamics
from the end of the 20th century to present times institutional discussions, including
the management of the sovereign debt crisis. Indeed, we argue that the latter is hard
to understand without a model that can rationalize the sequence of steps that led
European countries to choose a particular pattern of (sequential) integration where
cultural heterogeneity is properly accounted for.
4.2 Typical bilateral interactions
We assume that an economy can be described as a set of bilateral principal-agent
transactions. In each pair of players there is always one player who can choose
between a responsible action (e.g. when an agent chooses the action desired by the
principal without moral hazard or simply when an agent decides to respect the law
8According to Williamson (2000), while cultural norms typically change at a frequency (in years)
between 102to 103, governance institutions can change every 10 years.
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in the presence of temptations to do otherwise) and a cheating action (e.g. when an
agent shirks or falls for the temptation of dishonest short run gains); then there is
always a second player (a principal or a counterpart in a contract of whatever kind
or the State) deciding (or implementing) a reaction, which can be captured by the
choice between punishment and forgiveness. The dynamic representation of this
basic game of economic interaction is as follows:
Assumption 1: u1(cp) < u1(r) < u1(cf) and u2(cp) < u2(cf) < u2(r).
In words, this assumption says that a player nding herself in the position of
player 1 (rst mover) has a utility from cheating and being forgiven higher than the
utility from responsible behavior, while for a player nding herself in the position of
player 2 (principal) the order of utility levels for those action proles are reversed.
Moreover, for both players the least desirable action combination is when player 1
cheats and player 2 punishes, since in that case the cost inicted by the rst mover
to the second is basically reciprocated by another costly action, potentially costly
for both players. Finally, in case of responsible behavior r, we assume for simplicity
that the action by player 2 is payo¤ irrelevant: for example, if responsible behavior
implies that no debt is accumulated, then it doesnt matter whether the other player
is willing to lend to player 1 or not.
Under assumption 1 there are two Nash Equilibria: The rst Nash Equilibrium,
(c; f), is subgame perfect; the other equilibrium, (r; p), is not subgame perfect when
player 2 moves after observing player 1s choice (it involves the ex ante non credible
threat to punish after a cheating action by player 1).9
Responsible actions are in most interpretations associated with higher total wel-
fare, hence we assume that
9Note in fact that the strategy punish of the rst column has to be interpreted as a commitment
to punish after cheating, while after a responsible action of course there is nothing to punish, which
explains why we are assuming that ui(rp) = ui(rf) = ui(r) 8i.
12
Assumption 2:
P
i ui(cf) <
P
i ui(r).
In words, the unique SPE of the game in the absence of commitment is subopti-
mal in the utilitarian sense. The equilibrium (c; f) is preferred by a player in role 1,
but it does not maximize total welfare. We can think of this equilibrium as the most
likely equilibrium emerging in most types of economic interactions among Greeks.
On the other hand, we can think of the German cultural values as crucial ingredients
to produce the ability to commit to enforce contracts, laws and responsibility, in a
nutshell allowing to obtain the higher welfare Nash Equilibrium. When Germans in-
teract among themselves, they understand that the credibility of punishment threats
is high, hence no cheating, hence no ine¢ cient punishments in equilibrium.10
If we observe that one Nash equilibrium is always played in a country and the
other Nash equilibrium in another country, there are many senses in which we could
say that the two countries display di¤erent cultures. If all agents in an economy are
homogeneously convinced, when they are in player 1s position, that player 2 will
not punish after a cheat, naturally the (c; f) equilibrium prevails. If everybody in
the economy expects a player in player 2s role to punish, then responsible behavior
prevails. However, when the economy is no longer homogeneous in beliefs, the expec-
tations may di¤er and we need to study how do beliefs adjust over time. Similarly,
and this is going to be the primary and most direct way to model cultural evolution,
we can view a culture simply as a set of strategies that people use when playing in
a role, rather than relating to beliefs.
In what follows we analyze the evolution of strategies starting from any initial
condition in terms of culture, i.e. starting from any set of initial strategies (and,
equivalently, we could do the same in the case of culture as beliefs).
4.3 Evolutionary Replicator Dynamics
Consider rst an economy in isolation. Suppose that such an economy is large, in
the sense that there are a large number of matches between players, or, equivalently,
a large number of expected transactions, and in every such random match one player
(random or not) is in the position of player 1 in the game form described above and
the other one in the shoes of player 2.11
10The simpler way to formalize this in the standard world of rational agents is to allow for
repetition of the game and see the di¤erent perceptions of commitment likelihood simply as di¤erent
equilibria in the repeated game. We chose instead the evolutionary model for the reasons expressed
above.
11It could be that in some types of transactions some agents are always rst moving agents and
others are always second moving principals, but the analysis applies to also all other more symmetric
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Pairs of individuals, one from the population of agents (role 1) and one from the
population of principals (role 2), are randomly matched to play the game above.
Each individual is programmed to play one of the two pure strategies available to
her.
Denote by x 2 [0; 1] the fraction of rst movers programmed to play Cheat, and
by y the fraction of second movers programmed to play Forgive. A state of the
world is fully characterized by the population split (x; y). Starting from any initial
population split (x; y), we want to see how this population split evolves over time
and whether it converges to a steady state.
Standard replicator dynamics logic implies that for any given population split
(x; y) the proportion of individuals playing Cheat (x) will increase if and only if
the payo¤ to playing Cheat is larger than the average payo¤ of rst movers. More
precisely, the relative change in x is proportional to the tness of the strategy Cheat,
i.e. the di¤erence in payo¤s between Cheat and the current average payo¤ of rst
movers, namely
_x
x
= (u1(cf)y + u1(cp)(1  y))  (u1(r)(1  x) + u1(cf)xy + u1(cp)x(1  y))
Likewise, according to replicator dynamics the relative change in y is proportional
to the tness of the action Forgive relative to the average tness, namely:
_y
y
= (u2(cf)x+ u2(r)(1  x))  (u2(r)(1  x) + u2(cf)xy + u2(cp)x(1  y))
where the rst term is the payo¤ of Forgive against a proportion (x; 1  x) of rst
movers, the second is the average tness or payo¤of the population (y; 1  y) against
a proportion (x; 1  x).
4.4 Steady States
Normalizing ui(cp) = 0 8i, the system can be written as
_x
x
= (u1(cf)y   u1(r)) (1  x)
_y
y
= u2(cf)x  u2(cf)xy
situations in which whoever moves rst falls automatically in the role of player 1.
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Starting from any initial interior population split (x0; y0) the system evolves in
the following way: x decreases and eventually reaches zero if y0 < yr, with yr =
u1(r)=u1(cf), otherwise x increases and eventually reaches one if y0 > yr. Namely,
a high enough population of forgivers makes the Cheaters survive and thrive, a high
enough population of Punishers makes the Cheaters die and the Responsible thrive.
Proposition 1 For each country in isolation there are two types of steady states:
Steady state 1: all Cheaters and Forgivers (x1 = 1; y1 = 1). and Steady state 2:
rst movers all Responsible and a critical mass (1  yr) of Punishers (xr = 0; yr 2 [0; yr]) :
Steady State 1. is what prevailed in Greece: any mutation, e.g. a small percentage
of Punishers or of Responsible agents, would die out.
Steady State 2 is what prevailed in Germany: any mutation, e.g. a small per-
centage of Cheaters rst movers would die out because they faced costly Punishment
(this punishment is costly to the second movers).
4.5 Integration choices
Start from a situation in which the two countries - "Germany" and "Greece" in our
exemplication - were examples of closed homogeneous economiesthat converged
to the two steady states described above. Now merge the two populations. While
population strategies evolve slowly as described above, leaders of countries can make
institutional decisions - with treaties or alike - with standard utility calculations.
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However, when they do so their utility function needs to conform to their cultural
base, in the manner described below.
While in any economic or political match in which a German in player 1s role r is
e¢ cient because the Germans do not change their behavior in player 1s position, in
matches in which a Greek is in player 1s role followed by a German, determines the
worst possible outcome in that period: Cheat-Punish. The aggregate consequences
of all such matches, the macro consequences are dismal: the Greeks behavior at the
many levels of economic activities and irresponsible scal policy put the Germans in
the position to decide whether to punish or not upon having reached the cheating
node.
The direct connection between the games played by citizens in every day-life
match and the relationship between States is due to conformity constraints: the
German policy maker that plays in the column player role has to follow the culture
of the German citizens, and the Greek policy maker has to follow the strategy of
the Greek citizen/voter for the same reason. The shift from individuals to States
could be done in many ways, but the use of the conformity constraints is the easiest.
It amounts to assuming that the leader of a country has to conform to the current
culture of her citizens when dealing with other governments. However, leaders can
also agree on changing the institutions regulating their interaction making various
steps towards integration. Assuming the two countries are at their di¤erent steady
states at the moment of consideration of an institutional change, then if merging
the two economies provides no advantage in terms of economies of scale or scope
or alike, no merging would be preferred because of the adjustment costs due to the
costly Cheat-Punish matches occurring on the new path.
We see a benet of merging the economies in the enlargement of the total available
opportunities due to economies of scale or scope (as was stressed in the debate
around the creation of the single currency, see Baldwin, 2006 for a review)). In
any bilateral relation in the new merged economy this enlargement of the "cake"
can be captured by some scaling up of the payo¤s in the original payo¤ matrix,
while keeping assumptions 1 and 2 satised. We will denote by  the scaling factor
due to the merger. The advantage described below of choosing a scal union in
addition, is that a scal union allows the creation of new institutions taking the role
of principal in many relationships, and such a new set of principals can be endowed
with any punish-forgive strategy the players agree to, hence giving a better chance of
converging to a superior steady state and with lower transition costs. The cost is the
loss of sovereignty. We will try to model this choice in the simplest possible manner,
distinguishing the choice at an ex ante stage in which the economic advantages of
a union are uncertain from an ex post stage in which the utility e¤ects of economic
16
union is known.
4.5.1 Monetary Union without New Institutions
For reasons related mostly to debt accumulation or nancial strength, Greece is often
in the agents role and Germany is often in the principal column player role.12
The conformity constraint implies that the Greek leader has to conform to the
cfequilibrium while in Germany the presence of a critical mass of punishers induces
the leader to punish many cheating actions. The "forgiving" Greek authorities and
the "punitive" German authorities have to coexist, and the game between leaders of
States with such extremely di¤erent cultures is costly: all actions by Greek agents
involve cheating and a critical mass of reactions are punishments, leading to payo¤s
equal to (0,0) until one of the two strategies die o¤.
Given that all Greeks forgive and only a fraction yr of Germans forgive, we can
dene (1  yr) 2 [1  yr; 1] as a measure of cultural di¤erence.
Proposition 2 Total welfare from (monetary) integration without new (scal) in-
stitutions is decreasing in the cultural di¤erence (1  yr)
Proof. The payo¤ (average tness) for a merged population (under a union (U))
characterized by (x0; y0) is for each mover:
UU1 = u1(r)(1  x0) + u1(cf)x0y0
UU2 = u2(r)(1  x0) + u2(cf)x0y0
Hence total welfare is
UUT = (u1(r) + u2(r)) (1  x0) + (u1(cf) + u2(cf))x0y0
If the populations of Greece and Germany are respectively g and G, and if Greece
and Germany start from their respective steady states we have:
x0 =
g
g +G
; y0 =
g + yrG
g +G
12We repeat here that this vision is also compatible with a microfoundation that views every
economy as a collection of bilateral matches, showing that only Greek agents and German principals
su¤er the consequences of the cultural clash, and hence the sum of such situations can generate
an aggregate relationship that is equivalent to that between leaders of the two countries that is
postulated here on the basis of the conformity constraint. The introduction of the common currency
and the elimination of most frictions inhibiting cross-country matches, determine a situation in
which economic interactions are often bilateral contracts between players from di¤erent cultures,
i.e., between individuals that are programmed to play di¤erent strategies.
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UUT = (u1(r) + u2(r))
G
g +G
+ (u1(cf) + u2(cf))
(g + yrG) g
(g +G)2
so it is increasing in (1  yr) :
If being in a monetary union involved no additional surplus creation, then forming
a union without new institutions that could alter the cheat and punish frequency
would make sense only for Greeks.
Proposition 3 Absent surplus creation: 1. Greeks prefer a monetary union if there
is a high enough share of German forgivers yr. 2. Germans prefer no monetary
union.
Proof. Welfare before the union is (which can be broken down for the various types)
Ug = u1(cf) + u2(cf); UG = u1(r) + u2(r)
We need to analyze the gains from a union from the various types, Greek rst and
second movers:
UUg1 = u1(cf)y0 + 0 (1  y0) ; UUg2 = u2(r)(1  x0) + u2(cf)x0
The welfare gain from a monetary union from the Greek perspective is 
UUg   Ug

= (u1(cf)y0 + u2(r)(1  x0) + u2(cf)x0)  (u1(cf) + u2(cf))
0 =  u1(cf)

(1  yr)G
g +G

+ (u2(r)  u2(cf))

G
g +G

> 0
Hence, we have
 
UUg   Ug

> 0 when yr > ygr with:
ygr := 1 
u2(r)  u2(cf)
u1(cf)
The share of Punishers among Germans (i.e. the heterogeneity) needs to be bounded
for Greeks to prefer the monetary union, but when u2(r) > u1(cf) + u2(cf) the
constraint does not bind: the Greeks benet from the monetary union regardless.
German rst and second movers after the union
UUG1 = u1(r); U
U
G2f = u2(r)(1  x0) + u2(cf)x0; UUG2p = u2(r)(1  x0) + 0x0
We assume a German is a forgiver with chance yr, so:
UUG1 = u1(r); U
U
G2 = u2(r)(1  x0) + yru2(cf)x0
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The welfare gain from a monetary union from the German perspective is always
negative for any yr 2 [0; 1] 
UUG   UG

= (u1(r) + u2(r)(1  x0) + yru2(cf)x0)  (u1(r) + u2(r))
=   g
g +G
(u2(r)  yru2(cf))
Hence, the condition
 
UUG   UG

> 0 holds when yr > yGr with:
yGr :=
u2(r)
u2(cf)
> 1
which is violated for any yr 2 [0; 1] :
The Germans will always lose by encountering Greek cheaters, but their loss will
be smaller the more they are able to forgive.
Hence, there needs to be some surplus creation to have a benecial monetary
union for all participants, and this surplus needs to be large enough for the Germans
to prefer the monetary union. We call   1 this surplus creation that acts in a
multiplicative way on the payo¤s after the responsible action r:13
Proposition 4 With surplus creation the monetary union is preferred by both coun-
tries for small enough heterogeneity between the two countries. With large enough
surplus creation, both countries strictly prefer the monetary union for any level of
heterogeneity.
Proof.
UUg   Ug = (u1(cf)y0 + u2(r)(1  x0) + u2(cf)x0)  (u1(cf) + u2(cf))
=  u1(cf)G (1  yr)
g +G
+ (u2(r)  u2(cf)) G
g +G
> 0
Hence, we have
 
UUg   Ug

> 0 when yr > ygr () ; with:
ygr () := 1 
u2(r)  u2(cf)
u1(cf)
13To see why it is reasonable to make the monetary union have a multiplier e¤ect only for
responsible actions, consider a standard principal agent relation between a bank and a borrower.
If a borrower cheats (runs away with the money) the utility of the cheater, if not punished, is the
value of the money, which doesnt necessarily change after a monetary union; on the other hand, the
economies of scale, reductions of transaction costs, lower frictions in all markets, greater possibilities
of export for the countries who had a strong currency before the union, all these things make the
probability of success, for a borrower who invests the money on the proposed project responsibly,
higher.
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ygr () is decreasing in  and the constraint does not bind for high enough , namely:
 := g =
u1(cf) + u2(cf)
u2(r)
=) ygr () = 0
As for the Germans we have:
UUG   UG = (u1(r) + u2(r)(1  x0) + yru2(cf)x0)  (u1(r) + u2(r))
Hence, we have
 
UUG   UG

> 0 when yr > yGr () ; with:
yGr () :=  
(u1(r) + u2(r))
G
g
+ u1(r)
u2(cf)
+

1 +
G
g

u1(r) + u2(r)
u2(cf)
yGr () is decreasing in  and the constraint does not bind for high enough ; namely:
 := G =
1 + G
g
u1(r)
u1(r)+u2(r)
+ G
g
=) yGr () = 0
In sum, if for some   1; yr < yGr (), then the monetary union without a new
scal authority would not be viable for the Germans. For any   max (g; G) a
monetary unions is preferred by both countries regardless of the level of heterogeneity
between the countries (1  yr).
The above focuses on the short run costs of a monetary unions. In the long run
the risk of a monetary union is the possible convergence to the ine¢ cient steady
state, which might happen if later in the evolution of the dynamical system the
threshold yr is passed and the cheaters start to prosper again. The latter happens if
the initial y0 =
g+yrG
g+G
and/or x0 =
g
g+G
are large enough, so namely if the proportion
of German forgivers and of Greeks is large enough relative to the total population.
4.6 Integration with Creation of a Central Authority
4.6.1 Crisis and Break-up
Suppose  is subject to shocks. If  is expected to be high ex-ante, then yGr () and
ygr () are expected to be low and hence a monetary union (without creation of a new
authority) is preferable. However, if  after the monetary union is revealed to be low
(e.g. a crisis happens), then a breakup would be the natural outcome. In particular,
if yGr () > 1; then no union is preferred to a monetary union.
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4.6.2 Fiscal Union
Ascal union eliminates the game between the two separate leaders with independent
sovereignty. We assume for simplicity that this means that the new scal authority
or enforcement authority is endowed with a xed probability of forgiveness y0 > 0
that the leaders agree on.
There exist parameter values under which both countries prefer to choose a
new institution (scal union) that allows for an a xed frequency of punishments
(1  y0) :The higher the initial cultural di¤erence (1  yr), the greater the space of
parameters where a scal union with exogenous forgiveness y0can be benecial.
The creation of a scal union entails a cost which can be thought of as both the
cost of creation of such an institution and the cost of lost sovereignty. This cost C
is higher in good times (high ), because when returns are high then there is more
to redistribute for local constituencies by politicians.14 We hence assume the cost
function C () is increasing and unbounded.
Proposition 5 Both countries prefer the scal union to the monetary union if and
only if y0 > yr and  is below a threshold.
Proof. The scal union is preferred by both countries if the gain over the monetary
union exceeds the cost of the union. Namely,
UFUg   UUg = (y0   yr)u1(cf)
G
g +G
> C ()
UFUG   UUG = (y0   yr)u2(cf)
g
g +G
> C ()
The benet of a scal union is the short run avoidance of surplus destroying
matches. The intermediate y0 > yr cannot exceed yr =
u1(r)
u1(cf)
, because it would lead
to the wrong steady state. Beyond the cost of losing sovereignty another long run
cost of the scal union is that convergence to the steady state is slower the larger
y0 2 [0; yr] as the evolution is:
14The literature in political economy is full of seminal works emphasizing the importance of
strategically targeting di¤erent groups in society see e.g. Lindbeck and Weibul (1987), Dixit and
Londregan (1995), Lizzeri and Persico (2001). So, the opportunity cost of the formation of a scal
union for politicians who have to agree to form it is higher in good times, since in good times the
incumbents can more easily orchestrate reelection through strategic targeting, which they wont be
able to do once the purse of scal policy moves to a centralized ministry.
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_x
x
= (u1(cf)y
0   u1(r)) (1  x)
_y
y
= u2(cf)x (1  y0)
hence both populations evolve slower towards the e¢ cient steady state.
5 Evidence
In this section we o¤er some evidence in support of our story. We start reporting
some casual anecdotal evidence and then discuss some more systematic evidence
drawing from recurrent polls on samples of Germans and other European countries.
5.1 Anecdotal evidence
There are several pieces of casual evidence pointing in the direction that cultural
factors played a big role in how Germany has handled the Greek crisis, some reported
on the newspapers other reported privately to us. For instance, French newspaper
Le Canarde Enchainé reports that they heard France president Sarkozy saying o¤
the records "we are paying the cost of German orthodoxy" with reference to the
German resistance to second aid proposal to Greece (Le Canarde Enchainé, January
18, 2012). Even more telling is the story reported by a Greek colleague of hours who
teaches Economics in a German University in Frankfurt as it reects the sentiment
of the German population. After it became public in the early months of 2010 that
Greece cheated on the budget and the Greek crisis started to emerge as a problem,
his secretary recommended him to be much more careful in handling accounting
matters; he was puzzled by the recommendation and he asked why. The answer was:
"you know, you are Greek, and after this scandal..... you and us better become
more careful".
Even more surprising is what we have been told by an economist at the European
Central Bank. He reported to us that some German colleagues were severely criticized
and ostracized by their parents and relatives because in their view the European
Central Bank was too lenient towards Greece, to the point that one of them had to
consult a psychologist.
A third piece of casual evidence suggesting that cultural factors seem indeed to
be an integral part of the way Germany has handled the Greek crisis is the following
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reconstruction of Thomas Wiesers interpretation of the German government behav-
ior in the management of the crisis.15 In private talks he has argued that all the
problems that Europe has faced in dealing with the Greek crisis can be explained in
terms of religious background, and has provided the following rationale. In countries
with a relevant presence of Protestantism, such as Germany, moral and religious
precepts are so severe and that one will never be forgiven for his sins, nor will peo-
ple grant forgiveness to the sinners. In Catholic dominated countries, such as Italy,
Spain, Portugal and Ireland - four of the ve PIIGS - behavior is such that if one sins
he/she can always be forgiven if he/she repents and so make it into paradise. Finally,
according to Wieser, Orthodox religion is so loose that in countries dominated by it
- of which Greece is the leading one - if one sins there is not even a need for him/her
to repent to make it into paradise. This story is perfectly consistent with ours but
goes a step further, as it provides a rationale for why the Germans feel obliged to
punish the Greeks (the sinners) and why the Greeks cheated on the budget: their
religious background, dominated by Protestantism in Germany and by the Orthodox
church in Greece.
5.2 Evidence from polls
We use two recurrent polls sponsored by public TV stations. The ARD, which runs
the Deutschland-TREND survey, and the ZDF sponsors Politbarometer survey data
gathering information on German citizens feelings and opinions about the manage-
ment of the crisis as well as condence and support for their leader Angela Merkel.
Table 2 shows answers provided by participants in the polls interviewed at various
points in time during 2011 to di¤erent type of questions that we have organized in
groups and numbered for easy of reference. Some of these questions have been asked
also at various times in 2012 with very similar patterns of responses. The rst set of
questions (1 to 6) shows people opinions about whether Greece deserves being helped
and how Greece should be treated. Already in February 2010, few months after it
became public that the previous Greek government cheated on the budget and when
the debate was around the potential size of the aid required to avoid Greece default, a
poll by Emnid reveals that 67% of the Germans oppose any aid. Again, in July 2011,
when governments were discussing about the second tranche of transfers to Greece,
the vast majority of the Germans (60%) is against giving Greece a second round of
15Thomas Wiser is the Chairmen of the Economic and Financial Committee of the European
Union; the committee prepares the economic agenda for the European Finance meetings and is
thus exactly the place where negotiations on how to tackle the European sovereign debt crises take
place.
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rescue loans (question 1) and in October they continue to express a negative opinion
about whether the other European governments (not the German) should continue
to give support to Greece. In addition, more than 80% report that Greece should
be forced to leave the Euro if they did not accept the decisions on the euro rescue
(question 3). The pattern of answers is consistent with the idea that the opinions of
the Germans were guided by the desire to punish the Greeks (or Greece) for their
Government deceptive behavior. Interestingly, we can exclude that this opinions are
driven by stereotypes towards the Mediterranean countries because the vast majority
of the Germans (70%) when asked in September 2011 support the idea that Germany
helps economically Libyas reconstruction following the liberation war fought against
Gadda(question 8). And we can also exclude that the opposition to support Greece
reects a generic punishment towards European countries with problematic public
nances, because when the Germans are asked which country among the PIIGS
should be allowed to continue to be part of the Euro area, only a minority of them
report that Greece should remain in the Euro while the vast majority answers that
Spain, Italy and Ireland should stay in the Euro (with percentages in support of each
country equal to 77%, 73% and 67% respectively). It seems again that it is the desire
to punish Greece that leads the vast majority of the Germans (77%, question 8) to
dislike the expansion of the funds of the European Financial Stability Fund.
This is further conrmed by the Pew Research Center report who asks a sample
of Germans to report whether they have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, unfa-
vorable or very unfavorable opinion of Greece and several other European countries.
In the Spring of 2012, 79% of the Germans have an unfavorable opinion of Greece
and this is even higher than it was in the Spring of 2010 (Table 3). Germans have
instead only mild unfavorable opinions towards Italy and Spain despite their trou-
bled public nances: in the Spring of 2012, 33% of the Germans have an unfavorable
opinion of Italy and 26 of Spain and these opinions are not di¤erent from those ex-
pressed in early 2010 when the sovereign debt crisis had not yet extended to these
countries. Interesting, the judgement of the Germans vis à vis Italy and Spain is not
di¤erent from the opinion they have of the British (Table 3), again suggesting that
Germans unfavorable opinion of the Greeks reects a specic reaction in Germany
to the cheating behavior of the Greek government rather than a judgement for the
high level of debt of poorly performing economy during the Euro crisis.
These sentiments, besides being widespread among representative samples of the
general population and thus very likely to reect the opinions of the German median
voter, they are shared also by specic segments of the German population, namely
the business community which was particularly sensitive to a quick resolution of the
euro crisis. As Figure 2 shows, The vast majority of the German managers (81%)
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think that the most serious risks for the German economy come from the euro crisis
(Panel A); at the same time two out of three argue that the best response to this
crisis is to impose heavier sanctions to the debt transgressors - that is to punish
Greece.
These opinions, we argue, have to be followed by Mrs. Merkel who is bound by
the conformity constraint. One then expects that if she conforms to the constraint
this should be reected in the consensus polls. Indeed, as Angela Merkel has insisted
in her severe policy towards Greece16, approval of her policy has increased steadily: in
September 2011 45% of the Germans were satised with the way Angela Merkel was
handling the crisis; the proportion increases to 56% in November (question 9, Table
2) and 80% in the Spring of 2012. Interestingly, this is consensus towards Merkel not
towards her party as the vote intentions show little change (Table 2, question 10).
This is consistent with another implication of our story: whatever party or leader
is in charge should be equally subject to the conformity constraint. Hence, political
opinions should be little a¤ected.17
Finally, if punishment by the Germans has played a role in the management
of the crisis, then one would expect to see that: a) since people do not like to
be punished, we should observe some resentment of the "punished" - the Greeks -
towards the "punisher" - the Germans. This should be even more true if the culture
of the punished in one of forgiveness rather than punishment, so that the latter will
look unjust or excessive - another symptom of the cultural clash; b) the unfavorable
opinions towards Greece should be stronger in countries with a stronger culture of
punishment.
As for the rst implication, according to the Pew Research Center May 2012
Global Attitudes Report, anti-German sentiment has become prevalent in Greece,
where a majority (78%) has an unfavorable opinion of Germany, and nearly half
(49%) of the population saying they have a very unfavorable view and Germany
scores the largest fraction with an unfavorable opinion among the Greeks (Table 3,
16Mrs Merkel severe policy culminated in January 2012 in a proposal made informally to the other
member countries of the Eurozone to appoint a European commissioner with veto power on budget
decisions taken by the Greek government - Financial Times, January 27 2012 - as a condition for
approving the new rescue plan; this proposal was subsequently openly supported by the President
of the ECB -Spiegel, Octber 28 2012.
17Our model is consistent also with the fact that the Greek voters "punished" Papandreu in
2012 elections rather than the conservative party that was responsible for cheating on the budget
and thus for the subsequent German reaction. One can interpret Greek voters behavior in terms
or the anti-social punishment that characterizes Greece culture documented by Herrmann et al.
(2008): they "punished" the person who revealed that cheating occurred rather than punishing the
cheaters. This is not to say that this was the main driver of the vote; for instance, the Greeks may
have voted against Papandreu also because they did not like his austerity policy.
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Panel C) whereas it scores the lowest fraction of unfavorable opinions in most of the
other countries sampled (Table 3, Panels C-F). Greece is the only country where a
majority (84%) thinks German Chancellor Angela Merkel is doing a bad job dealing
with the economic crisis. And they are intensely critical: 57% say she is doing a very
bad job and the Greeks are the least likely among Europeans surveyed to say the
Germans are hardworking.
To provide some suggestive evidence on the second implication we correlate the
share of people of di¤erent European countries that, according to Pew Research have
an unfavorable opinion of Greece in the Spring of 2012 with the share of people that
are ready to participate in punishing. As a proxy for the latter we use the share of
people in each country that say they are very likely to call the police if they see a
man get his wallet stolen (see Table 1, Panel B). As shown in Figure 3, though based
on very few observations, the correlation is clearly positive (correlation coe¢ cient =
0.57), and is thus consistent with this implication.
Before concluding we address a potential objection. Since the evidence discussed
so far draws on views expressed in the months after January 2010, it may be argued
that the unfavorable opinions that the Germans have of the Greeks vis à vis the other
PIIGS reect an anti-Greek sentiment of the Germans that pre-dates the crisis rather
than the Germans cultural reaction to the deceptive behavior of the Greeks. And a
similarly objection could be raised for the unfavorable opinions that the Greeks have
of the Germans. Unfortunately the questions summarized in the previous tables were
only asked after the discovery that Greece cheated on the budget. To address this
objection we use data on bilateral trust - that is the trust a sample of citizens in
a European country have towards citizens of another European country - collected
by Eurobarometer well before the Great Recession. In a sequence of surveys run up
to 1995 Eurobarometer has asked participants in the survey the following question :
I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from
various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some
trust, not very much trust or no trust at all". Details about the surveys are reported
in Guiso et al (2009). To summarize the answers we have computed the average
percentage share of Germans and Greeks that report they trust a lot people of each
of the other countries included in Eurobarometer. Table 4 shows this measures of
trust for the average of all countries (last row) and for a selected group of countries
that overlap as much as possible with those in Table 3.
Interestingly, 11% of the Germans report that they trust the Greeks a lot - a gure
that is somewhat below how much the Germans trust on average people of all other
European countries (16%), but higher than the trust they have towards the Italians
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(8%) and comparable to the trust they have towards the Portuguese (11%) and the
Irish (13%). This suggests that there was no specic unfavorable view of the Germans
towards the Greeks before the specic event - the cheating on Greece budget - that
has triggered the crisis. Similarly, there was no pre-existing unfavorable Greek view
towards the Germans: 18% of the Greeks trusted the Germans a lot, somewhat above
how much the Greeks trusted other Europeans (last row of Table 4) and more than
the trust the Greeks had towards the Italians, the British or the Portuguese. Thus,
the Greeks unfavorable judgment towards the Germans in 2012 that we document in
Table 3 is likely to reect not a pre-existing Greek anti-German sentiment but the
reaction to the German punishment.
5.3 Dealing with Alternative Explanations
In this section we discuss possible alternative and more standard explanations behind
the ine¢ cient delay in managing the Greek crisis. Our purpose is not to dismiss
these factors and argue that they were unimportant, but rather to show that what
we interpret as a cultural clash is not just the reection of some other force. A rst
objection to our proposed explanation is that countries had di¤erent incentives to
save Greece because they could have been di¤erentially a¤ected by a propagation of
the Greek crisis; namely, the Mediterranean countries had stronger incentives to bail
out Greece because they feared a contagion of the crisis while this fear was absent
in Germany. Hence, Germany could safely (and selshly) oppose costly transfers for
the German taxpayer, and the Germans hostile opinions towards Greece just reects
these economic incentives. To address this objection notice rst that the di¤erent
reaction of the Germans (and the position of the German government to the Greek
crisis) compared to that of other European citizens/governments emerges soon after
it becomes public that Greece cheated on the budget. As shown in Table 2, (rst
row), already in February 2010 the vast majority of the Germans oppose transfers
to Greece. At the time, however, interest rate spreads show no evidence of a risk
of contagion to other European countries, with or without budget problems. Figure
4 compares the spread on the Greek 10-year government bond with respect to the
German Bund with that of the other PIIGS (Panel A) and of France (Panel B).
Greece spread starts to increase right after the new Socialist government announced
in October 2009 that the true decit was about twice as large as the gure di¤used
by the previous government (the rst vertical line). The spread of the other PIIGS,
however, shows initially little change. For instance, up until March 2010, while
Greece spread increases by about 300 basis points, Ireland spread is constant or
slightly decreasing. The spread of PIIGS starts to increase in proximity of and right
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after the adoption of the rst aid package in April-May 2010, suggesting that markets
fear of contagion as reected in the spreads was induced by a perceived failure of the
bail out policy. Another and perhaps more compelling way to address the objection
is to notice that it cannot explain the di¤erent views of the French and the Germans
vis a vis Greece. France spread is essentially at all through until June 2011, that
is until the Greek crisis develops into a crisis of the single currency. Until then,
markets anticipate no risk of contagion to France. Hence, France and Germany are,
along these dimensions fully comparable. Yet, Germans sentiments are much more
unfavorable to Greece than French sentiments already in the Spring of 2010: while
35% of the French have an unfavorable opinion of Greece the fraction of unfavorable
is twice as large among the Germans (see Table 3, Panel A and Panel C). This is
instead consistent with a German-Greek cultural clash, even more so in light of the
fact the French have a weaker attitude to punish than the Germans - as shown by
the willingness to participate in punishment (Table 1, Panel B).
A second concern is that the reaction of the Germans towards Greece compared
to that of other European countries may just reect a lower exposure of the German
banks (and German investors) to the Greek sovereign debt, weakening any incentive
Germany may have had to bail out Greece. However, the data tell a di¤erent story.
At the beginning of 2010m while French and German banks were in Europe the
most exposed to Greece, accounting for 66% of total Greek debt to European banks
(split 41% French banks and 25% German banks). The banks of these two countries
together held 64% of the Greek government debt, of which 43% in the hands of
German banks (Table 5). Thus, it was in Germanys interest, as much as France, to
push towards a bail out of Greece, sharing the cost with the other European countries
in proportion to their GDP.We see the opposite (it is Germany that more than France
and the other EU countries that opposed the bailout). The culture-based explanation
is instead consistent with the angry reaction of the Germans towards Greece once
they discovered that the debtor hided its ability to repay by concealing the overall
size of his debt. Models of betrayal aversion (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004) indeed
predict that individuals su¤er a greater utility loss (and thus get angrier) when
the loss springs from the mis-behavior of a person rather than nature; furthermore,
sensitivity to betrayal is likely to vary across countries (Bohnet, Greig, Herrman and
Zeckhauser, 2008) and be greater in countries where keeping promises (and punishing
those who do not) is a key part of their culture, as it seem to be the case in Germany.
Hence, ceteris paribus one would expect greater reaction in Germany than in France.
A nal possibility is that Germany desire to "punish" Greece arises as an op-
timal strategy to discipline future moral hazard by the Greeks (and indeed by any
other member of the union). Punishment may reect an ex ante agreement among
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the member countries of the monetary union to discipline countries that with their
behavior threaten the stability of the union. Without denying that moral hazard
worries may have played a relevant role in the reluctance of some of the European
countries to help out Greece, we argue that it is unlikely that it can explain all
without any role for cultural clash considerations. In fact, the moral hazard story,
literally taken, implies that all countries should be involved and share the punish-
ment strategy, which seems to be contradicted by the tougher German positions.
Second, the moral hazard story has an implication for the time prole of Germans
sentiments that di¤ers from the cultural clash explanation. Under moral hazard,
Germanssentiments towards Greece should be mitigated by the introduction of the
balance budget rules and more sever monitoring of future scal policies in member
countries adopted with the Fiscal Compact agreement in the Spring of 2012. Under
the cultural clash explanation because these sentiments are a reaction to the past
behavior of the Greeks, they should either be constant or even amplied by the bail
out packages decided meanwhile. The data in Table 3, Panel A seem to be more
consistent with the latter than with the former explanation: if anything, Germans
views towards Greece have deteriorated between the Spring of 2010 and that of 2012.
6 Conclusions
Cultural norms can e¤ect economic outcomes through several channels. In this pa-
pers we have highlighted a novel and thus far unexplored channel through which this
can happen: culture can act as a conformity constraint on policy makers and this
may result, in certain circumstances, in suboptimal outcomes. We show that this
is likely to happen when two (or more cultures) have to face each other as when
governments of di¤erent countries that belong to some economic union are forced to
interact. The cultural di¤erence and the di¤erent behaviors that each culture com-
mands can result in a political clash. Though policy makers are bound by the cultural
norms over which they have no control and that evolve slowly, they can still design
common institutions which can temper the e¤ects of the clash. We apply these ideas
to shed light on the European sovereign debt crisis triggered by the announcement
by the new elected government in the Fall of 2009 that Greece government decit
was much larger than reported by the previous government, which cheated on the
budget gures. Besides rationalizing the German/Greek contrast and why Germany
has shown resistance to bail Greece out, our model has much more general features
regarding the interplay between culture and institutions. In out set the slow moving
nature of cultural norms can speed up a process of institutional convergence when
the cultural (and political clash) results in particularly costly outcomes. Our model,
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however, does not study how cultural norms evolve in response to the creation of the
new institution and the implication for the long run steady state of the economy, an
issue that we leave for future work.
About the desirability of a scal union, we have highlighted several conceptual
points. First of all, while usually a scal unions main role is described to be that
of providing insurance through countercyclical regional transfers, a scal union per-
forms another important role: it allows to replace multiple authorities subject to
cultural clash (through the conformity constraint or more directly) with a unique
new authority, hence facilitating convergence, commitment, and enforcement. Sec-
ond, an important message of the paper is that the value of a scal unication step
is greater the higher the cultural heterogeneity.
30
References
[1] Akerlof, George A. (2007), "The Missing Motivation in Macroeconomics", Amer-
ican Economic Review, 97(1): 536.
[2] Alesina, Alberto, Paola Giuliano, and Nathan Nunn (2011), "On the Origins of
Gender Roles: Women and the Plough," NBER WP 17098.
[3] Algan Yann and Piere Cahuc (2010), "Inherited Trust and Growth", American
Economic Review,
[4] Ardagna Silvia and Francesco Caselli (2012), "The Political-Economy of the
Greek Debt Crisis: A Tale of Two Bailouts" American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, forthcoming
[5] Avdjiev Stefan, Christian Upper and Karsten von Kleist (2010), "Highlights of
international banking and nancial market activity", BIS Quartely Bullettin,
September
[6] Baldwin, Richard, (2006), "The Euro Trade E¤ects", Working Paper Series 594,
European Central Bank.
[7] Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier (2000a), "Beyond the Melting Pot: Cul-
tural Transmission, Marriage and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 955-88.
[8] Bisin, A. and T. Verdier (2000b): "Models of Cultural Transmission, Voting and
Political Ideology," European Journal of Political Economy, 16, 5-29.
[9] Bisin, A and T. Verdier (2001): "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and
the Dynamics of Preferences,"Journal of Economic Theory, 97, 298-319.
[10] Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier (2012), "On the Joint Evolution of Culture
and Institutions ", New York University WP.
[11] Bohnet, Iris and Richard Zeckhauser, (2004), "Trust, Risk and betrayal", Joirnal
of Economic Behaviour and Organization", 55(4): 467-484
[12] Bohnet, Iris, Fiona Greig, Benedikt Herrmann and Richard Zeckhauser, (2008)
"Betrayal Aversion: Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey
and the Unitred States", American Economic Review 98:1, 294-310
31
[13] Bottazzi, Laura, Thomas Hellmann and Marco Da Rin (2007), "The importance
of Trust for Investment: Evidence from Venture Capital", NBER WP 16923
[14] Boyd, Robert and Peter J. Richerson (1985), "Culture and the Evolutionary
Process", London: University of Chicago Press.
[15] Boyd, Robert and Peter J. Richerson, (2005), "The Origin and Evolution of
Cultures", Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[16] Buetzer, Sasha, Christina Jordan and Livio Stracca (2012), "Euro Area Imbal-
ances: A Matter of Culture?", European Central Bank WP.
[17] Dixit, Avinash K., and Londregan, John B. (1995) Redistributive Politics and
Economic E¢ ciencyAmerican Political Science Review 89, 85666.
[18] Herrmann, Benedikt, Christian Thöni and Simon Gächter (2008), "Antisocial
Punishment Across Societies", Science, 319, pp: 1362-1367
[19] Fahri, Emmanuel and Ivan Werning (2012), "Fiscal Unions", NBER WP 18280
[20] Fernandez, Raquel.(2007). Women. Work and Culture. Journal of the Euro-
pean Economic Association. 5(2-3). pp. 305-332.
[21] Fisman, Raymond , Yasushi Hamao and Yongxiang Wang, (2012), "The Impact
of Cultural Aversion on Economic Exchange: Evidence from Shocks to Sino-
Japanese Relations, Columbia University working paper
[22] Grosjean, Pauline (2011), "A History of Violence: The Culture of Honor as a
Determinant of Homicide in the US South", Austrian School of Business WP.
[23] Greif, Avner. 1994. Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A His-
torical and Theoretical Reection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies,
Journal of Political Economy, 102(5):912950.
[24] Gorodnichenko, Y. and Roland, Gerard, (2011a),"Which Dimensions of Cul-
ture Matter for Long Run Growth?" American Economic Review. Papers and
Proceedings, forthcoming
[25] Gorodnichenko, Yuri, and Roland, Gerard, (2011b), "Culture, Institutions and
the Wealth of Nations", working paper
32
[26] Guiso, Luigi. Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales (2004). The Role of Social
Capital in Financial Development. The American Economic Review. 94(3).
526-556.
[27] Guiso, Luigi. Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales (2006). Does Culture A¤ect
Economic Outcomes?. Journal of Economic Perspectives (2006) 20: 23-48.
[28] Guiso, Luigi. Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales (2008a). Long-Term Persis-
tence.NBER Working Paper W14278.
[29] Guiso, L. P. Sapienza, and L. Zingales (2008b): "Social Capital and Good Cul-
ture," Marshall Lecture, Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(2-3),
295-320.
[30] Guiso, Luigi. Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales (2009). "Cultural Biases in
Economic Exchange?". Quarterly Journal of Economics. (124) 3: 1095-1131
[31] Landes, David (1999), "The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So
Rich and Some So Poor ", W.W. Norton, New York.
[32] Lindbeck, A.,Weibull, J., (1987) Balanced-budget redistribution as the out-
come of political competitionPublic Choice 52, 273-97.
[33] Lizzeri, A., Persico, N., (2001), The provision of public goods under alternative
electoral incentives.American Economic Review 91, 225245.
[34] Luque, J., Massimo Morelli and Josè Tavares (2012), "A Volatility-based Theory
of Fiscal Union Formation," mimeo, Columbia University.
[35] Mokyr, Joel (2012), "The Enlightened Economy: An Economic History of
Britain 1700-1850. Penguin Press, forthcoming
[36] Morelli, Massimo, Huanxing Yang and Lixin Ye (2012), "Competitive Nonlinear
Taxation and Constitutional Choice", American Economic Journal 4, 142-75.
[37] Nunn, Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon (2011),"The Slave Trade and the Ori-
gins of Mistrust in Africa," American Economic Review, Vol. 101, No. 7, De-
cember 2011, 3221-3252
[38] Nunn, Nathan (2012), "Culture and the Historical Process", NBER WP 17869
[39] Tabellini, Guido (2008a). Institutions and Culture.Presidential address, Jour-
nal of the European Economic Association, 6,(2-3),255-94.
33
[40] Tabellini, Guido (2008b). The Scope of Cooperation: Normes and Incentives.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(3), 905-50 Association, 6,(2-3),255-94.
[41] Voth, Joachim and Nico Voigtländer (2012), "Persecution Perpetuated: The
Medieval Origins of Anti-Semitic Violence in Nazi Germany", Quarterly Journal
of Economics 2012, 127(3): 1339-1392.
[42] Williamson, Olivier (2000), "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock,
Looking Ahead", The Journal of Economic Literature, 38(3): 595-613.
34
Table 1. Greece and Germany cultural difference 
In Panel A Variables are obtained  from the 1999‐200 World Values Surveys  (WVS).   Reported measures of civicness are 
based on the following question: “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be  justified, or something  in between, using this card.” Answers are  in the range 1‐10, with 1 = ”always 
justifiable” and 10 =“never justifiable” (after recoding the original answers). “Claiming government benefits to which you 
are not entitled”. “Avoiding a fare on public transport”. “Cheating on taxes if you have a chance”. “Accepting a bribe in the 
course of  their duties”. The principal component of civic values  is extracted using  these variables and  three additional 
measures  based  on  the  following  answers:    “Lying  in  your  own  interest”.  “Throwing  away  litter  in  a  public  space”. 
“Speeding over  the  limit  in build‐up areas”. Tabellini  (2009)  cultural  capital  indicators are  constructed as  follows:    the 
variable respect is set equal to 1 if the respondent indicates the quality “tolerance and respect for other people” as being 
one of the top five qualities children are encouraged to  learn at home. Obedience  is the fraction of people that regards 
obedience  as  an  important quality  that  children  should be  encouraged  to  learn.    Finally,  control  is  the  answer  to  the 
question “Some people  feel  they have completely  free choice and control over  their  lives, while other people  feel  that 
what we do has no real effect on what happens to them.” Generalized trust is the answer to the classical WVS question 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful  in dealing with 
people?” The number of observations are 3,036 for Germany and 1142 for Greece.  In Panel B variables are obtained from 
responses given by a sample of German citizens and a sample of Greek citizens in the 2010 Wave II of the European Social 
Survey to the following questions: “ Imagine that you were out  and saw someone push a man to the ground and steal his 
wallet. How likely would you be to call the police? Would you be”…(possible answers coded from 1 to 4: not at all likely, 
not  very  likely,  likely,  very  likely);    “How willing  would  you  be  to  identify  the  person  who  had  done  it? Would  you 
be…(possible answers coded from 1 to 4: not at all willing, not very willing, willing, very willing);  “And how willing would 
you be  to give evidence  in court against  the accused? Would you be…”  (possible answers coded  from 1 to 4: not at all 
willing, not very willing, willing, very willing).  
 
A. Civic values, cultural norms and trust beliefs 
Variables  Germany  Greece  Difference 
Germany‐Greece 
t‐test for the 
difference 
Measures of civic values         
Claiming Government benefits you 
are not entitled to  
9.00  6.96  2.04  24.7 
Avoiding a fare on public transport  9.04  7.57  1.47  19.19 
Cheating on taxes  8.63  7.83  0.80  9.27 
Accept a bribe  9.06  9.07  ‐0.01  ‐014 
Tabellini (2009) cultural norms 
indicators 
       
Respect  0.71  0.52  0.19  10.42 
Obedience  0.14  0.11  0.03  2.51 
Control  7.25  7.00  0.25  3.70 
Unselfishness  0.09  0.26  ‐0.18  ‐13.32 
Beliefs         
Generalized trust  0.38  0.24  0.14  7.58 
 
 B. Willingness to participate in punishment of wrongdoers  
 
Variables  Germany  Greece  Difference 
Germany‐Greece 
t‐test for the 
difference 
Measures of participation in 
punishment  
       
How likely to call the police if you 
see a man get his wallet                        
stolen ? 
3.75  3.47  0.28      16.61 
How willing to identify person who 
had done it^ 
3.66  3.24  0.42   22.32 
How willing to give evidence in 
court against the accused? 
3.55  2.90  0.65     29.07 
 
Variables  Germany  France  Difference 
Germany‐France 
t‐test for the 
difference 
Measures of participation in 
punishment  
       
How likely to call the police if you 
see a man get his wallet                        
stolen ? 
3.75  3.60  0.15  8.35 
How willing to identify person who 
had done it^ 
3.66  3.45  0.21 
 
10.65 
How willing to give evidence in 
court against the accused? 
3.55  3.27  0.28  12.39 
 
 
 
. 
 
Table 2. Germans opinions during the crisis      
The table shows the answers provided by a sample of Germans to questions concerning the management of the European 
sovereign debt crisis. Variables are obtained  from two   recurrent polls sponsored by public tv stations. The ARD, which  
runs the Deutschland‐TREND survey, and the ZDF sponsors the Politbarometer survey (denoted Politb in the table). These 
are  representative polls with  a  sample  size of  about 1000.  The polls  take place  at  a monthly  (Deutschland‐TREND) or 
biweekly  (Politbarometer)  frequency.  These  polls  elicit  attitudes  towards  people  sentiments,  political  opinions  and 
opinions about policy options for dealing with Greece and the European sovereign crisis.   
Question n  Question wording  Yes No
  Support to Greece   
1  “Should Greece receive financial aid?” (February, 2010, Emnid) 33% 67%
  Should Greece be given a second round of rescue loans? (June 
2011, Politb) 
36% 60%
     
2  Should the other European‐States continue to support Greece?  
(October 2011, D‐T) 
42% 53%
     
3  Will Greece have to leave the eurozone if it does not accept the 
decisions on the euro rescue? (November 2011, D‐T) 
82% 15%
     
4  Would Greek bankruptcy entail negative consequences for 
Germany? (September 2011, Politb) 
30% 68%
     
5  Who should continue to be a member of the euro zone? (July 
2011, Politb) 
 
   ‐ Greece  47% 53%
   ‐ Spain  77% 23%
   ‐ Italy  73% 27%
   ‐ Ireland  67% 33%
6   Do you think  that new government in Greece helps overcoming 
the crisis ? (November 2011, Politb) 
23% 60%
     
  Support funding the European Financial Stability Fund  
7  Should the funds of the EFSF be expanded?  (September 2011, 
Politb)  
20% 76%
  Support to Libya    
8  Should Germany support economically Libyas reconstruction?  
(September 2011, D‐T) 
70% 27%
     
9  Support to Merkel   
10  Are you satisfied with Angela Merkel's handling of the crisis? 
(Politb) 
 
   ‐ September  2011  45% 65%
   ‐October        2011  51% 49%
   ‐November    2011  56% 44%
  ‐ January        2012  63% 37%
  ‐ Spring          2012  (PEW Global Attitudes Project, May 2012) 80% 20%
11  Support to Merkel political party  Christian Democrat   Social Democrat
  ‐ Vote intentions: September 2011 35% 28%
   ‐ Vote intentions: October 2011  32% 30%
   ‐ Vote intentions: November 2011 34% 31%
  ‐ Vote intentions: January 2012  35% 30%
  ‐ Vote intentions: November 2012 39% 30%
Table 3. Germans, Greeks and other countries views during the clash      
The various Panels of the table show the answers provided by a sample about 1,000  people in each of the countries the 
panel refers to (Panel A Germans, Panel B, Greeks, Panel C French, Panel D French, Panel E Italian, Panel F Spain,) to the 
question “Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of 
[country name]” that was asked in the Pew Research Center May 2012 Report of the Global Attitudes Project.   
 
A. German View 
Variables  Greece  Italy Spain France  UK
     
  Spring 2012
Somewhat unfavorable  50  31 25 17 27
Very unfavorable  23  2 1 2 2
Total unfavorable  79  33 26 19 29
  Spring 2010
Somewhat unfavorable  45  24 16*    29 *
Very unfavorable  12  4 3* 3*
Total unfavorable  70  28 19*  32*
 
B. Greek View 
Variables  France  Italy Spain Germany  UK
     
  Spring 2012
Somewhat unfavorable  28  21 14 29 36
Very unfavorable  17  10 11 49 26
Total unfavorable  45  31 25 78 52
 
C. French View (Spring 2012) 
Variables  Greece  Italy Spain Germany  UK
     
Somewhat unfavorable  32  26 23 11 18
Very unfavorable  22  7 6 5 5
Total unfavorable  54  33 29 16 23
    Spring 2010  
Somewhat unfavorable  27  18 7  
Very unfavorable  8  5 2  
Total unfavorable  35  23 9  
 
D. British view    
Variables  Greece  Italy Spain Germany  France
    Spring 2012  
Somewhat unfavorable   33  18 14 14 21
Very unfavorable  12  5 3 7 8
Total unfavorable  55  23 17 21 29
    Spring 2010  
Somewhat unfavorable   16  7 10  
Very unfavorable  4  2 5  
Total unfavorable  20  9 15  
 
 
E. Italian view (Spring 2012) 
Variables  Greece  France Spain Germany  UK
Somewhat unfavorable   45  30 31 21 21
Very unfavorable  22  13 23 7 7
Total unfavorable  67  43 54 28 28
 
 
 
 
F. Spanish view  
Variables  Greece  Italy France Germany  UK
    (Spring 2012)  
Somewhat unfavorable   33  28 20 13 17
Very unfavorable  32  12 10 8 9
Total unfavorable  65  40 30 21 26
    Spring 2010  
Somewhat unfavorable   30  11 10  
Very unfavorable  10  3 1   
Total unfavorable  40  14 11  
 
Table 4. Germany and Greece bilateral trust views before the clash  
The  table  shows  the  fraction of Germans  and Greeks  that  report  that  they  trust  a  lot  citizens of  the other  European 
countries. Trust is calculated from the average response to the following question asked in Eurobarometer in a sequence 
of surveys   run up to 1995: “I would  like to ask you a question about how much trust you have  in people  from various 
countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all". The 
answers are coded in the following way:=1 ( no trust at all), = 2 (not very much trust), =3 (some trust), =4 (a lot of trust). 
Details about the surveys are reported in Guiso et al (2009). The last row is the average percentage share of Germans and 
Greeks  that  report  they  trust  a  lot people of  all  the other  countries  included  in Eurobarometer  and  gives  a  summary 
measure of how much citizens of a given country trust citizens of their own or other countries.   
 
Country receiving trust   Fraction of Germans trusting a lot   Fraction of Greeks trusting a lot   
The Greeks  0.11  ‐ 
The Germans  ‐  0.18 
The Italians  0.08  0.12 
The Spanish  0.14  0.21 
The Portuguese    0.11  0.17 
The Irish  0.13  0.17 
The French  0.21  0.26 
The British  0.15  0.16 
Other European countries    0.16  0.17 
 
Table 5.  Exposures of Germany and France  to Greece and other PIIGS countries 
The table shows the value of the claims of German and France banks towards Grees, Ireland, Portugal and Spain at the end 
of Quarter 4 2009. Data are in billions of US Dollars. Source: BIS Quartely Bullettin.  
    
 
    Claims toward  
    Greece  Ireland Portugal Spain  Total claims to 
the four 
countries 
Claims of       
Germany       
  Total  44.4  176.9 41.0 202.4  464.8
  Public sector  22.8  2.5 10.3 32.7  68.3
France       
  Total  108.3  84.8 52.0 248.2  493.3
  Public sector  30.6  6.1 20.8 48.1  105.6
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Differences in willingness to punish among Germans and Greeks 
The figure  shows the distribution of responses given by a sample of German citizens and a sample of Greek citizens in the 
2010 Wave II of the European Social Survey to the following questions: “ Imagine that you were out and saw someone push 
a man to the ground and steal his wallet. How likely would you be to call the police? Would you be”…(possible answers 
coded from 1 to 4: not at all likely, not very likely, likely, very likely);  “How willing would you be to identify the person 
who had done it? Would you be…(possible answers coded from 1 to 4: not at all willing, not very willing, willing, very 
willing);  “And how willing would you be to give evidence in court against the accused? Would you be…” (possible 
answers coded from 1 to 4: not at all willing, not very willing, willing, very willing). The histograms of the answers to the 
three questions are reported in Panel A, B and C respectively.     
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B. Willingness to identify person  
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C. Willingness to give evidence in court  
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Figure 2. Risk and solutions for the Euro crisis perceived by German managers  
The figures shows the percentages of responses chosen by a sample of German managers interviewed in the December 2012 
IFO German Managers Survey. Panel A shows the chosen answers to the questions: “Which risks do firms see for the 
economy?”. Panel B the answers to the question.” Which solutions to the euro crisis do firms prefer?”. Multiple answers 
possible. Responses from 655 companies from the manufacturing, constructions, trade and service sector. 
http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/a-winfo/d1index/80mgrbefr/_managerbefragung?item_link=mb-
konjunktur-dez11.htm 
  
Panel A : Risk perceived by German managers 
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Panel B : Preferred solutions for the euro crisis 
Managers preferred solutions for the euro crisis
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Figure 3. Unfavorable view of Greece and punishing attitude 
The figure shows the relation between the fraction of people in some European countries with an unfavorable view of 
Greece and the attitude towards punishing in this country. The latter is measures by the fraction of people who answer “very 
likely” to the question: ”Imagine that you were out and saw someone push a man to the ground and steal his wallet. How 
likely would you be to call the police? Would you be”…(possible answers coded from 1 to 4: not at all likely, not very 
likely, likely, very likely)” asked in the second wave of the European Social Survey. Correlation between the two  variables 
is 0.57. 
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Figure 4. Interest rate spreads vis-à-vis the Germans Bund   
The figure shows interest rates spreads on 10-years government bonds of Greece and a set of other European countries vis-
à-vis the German Bund.  Panel A compares Greece spreads with  Belgium and France; Panel B Greece spreads with  Italy, 
Spain and Portugal.   
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A. Greece spread versus Italy, Spain, Ireland and Portugal 
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